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LET THEM LEARN: RECOGNIZING AND CODIFYING A DESIGN-






Organizations often conduct probing self-studies to review 
internally existing policies, procedures, and business methods. Yet, 
despite an increasing social need for these studies, the Texas 
legislature has yet to construct a privilege designed to protect an 
organization from being harmed from these studies by adverse 
litigants. The self-critical analysis privilege, or SCAP, is an alluring, 
common law doctrine that protects the free flow of information 
sharing through an organization’s self-assessment. This Comment 
proposes a model statute for the codification of the SCAP for the 
consideration of the Texas legislature. This model statute is not a 
general codification of the privilege. Instead, the statute is meant to 
apply only to Texas’s Design-Build industry. This Comment discusses 
the significant policy considerations supporting the SCAP and 
analyzes case law to derive proper drafting language. Although this 
proposed model statute narrowly applies to Texas’s Design-Build 
industry, the hope is to have a workable statute that could apply to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Texas, the scope of discovery covers “any matter that is not 
privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.”1 
This means any conclusory opinions based on internal investigations 
are discoverable.2 Enter the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
(“SCAP”), which shields the “opinions and recommendations of 
corporate employees engaged in the process of critical self-evaluation 
for the purpose of improving health and safety.”3 
The SCAP may be one of the most misunderstood common 
law protections.4 It has applied very narrowly to hospital committee 
reports, certain business investigation reports, and some Title VII 
 
 1. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). 
 2. See generally The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, Note, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1083, 1083 (1983). 
 3. Felder v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 153 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224–25 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 4. Hardy v. N.Y. News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying 
the privilege to certain communications only after noting that “several courts have 
raised serious questions about [its viability]”). 
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actions.5 Largely, courts refuse to acknowledge the existence of the 
SCAP outright.6 This Comment argues that the SCAP should be 
adopted in Texas to allow businesses to candidly make improvements 
in the quality and safety of goods and services.  
The premise of this Comment’s argument is that businesses do 
not have the appropriate incentives to take the steps to improve 
themselves absent the SCAP.7 But this Comment does not argue for, 
as others have, a broad SCAP statute applicable to all industries.8 
Rather, this Comment urges an adoption of the SCAP solely to those 
internal reports used in the Texas architecture and construction 
(“Design-Build”) industry.  
Although there are many benefits to having the SCAP, this 
Comment understands a wide adoption would likely not be feasible in 
light of the significant policy concerns other scholars have rightly 
pointed out.9 These concerns impacted the decision to narrow the 
SCAP to the Design-Build industry. The hope, however, is that the 
SCAP’s success in the Design-Build industry will eventually be 
adopted to the products-liability, oil and gas, or other property related 
industries in Texas.  
Fortunately, Texas’s Design-Build industry presents ample 
ground for development and would massively benefit from the 
SCAP.10 As shown in Part II of this Comment, the Design-Build 
industry is adopting “lessons-learned” policies to create safe and 
innovative work environments inside and outside of the field.11 These 
lessons-learned policies effectuate the same policy rationales 
underlying the SCAP.12  
Part III will compare and contrast the federal and Texas 
privilege laws to derive guidance and support for a proposed statute.13 
For reasons discussed in Part III, the Texas Legislature must codify 
the SCAP.14 As such, this Comment will also discuss various 
 
 5. The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 2, at 1090–91. 
 6. Id. at 1091. 
 7. See generally David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical 
Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (1988). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See, e.g., The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 2, at 1091. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part II–III. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. Id. 
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approaches the language of a proposed SCAP statute could take. Part 
IV will discuss the SCAP in detail and explore its application in a 
myriad of industries, drawing important lessons from case facts and 
court rationales.15 Part V will discuss the ineffectiveness of other 
privileges to further the needs of Texas’s Design-Build industry.16 
Finally, Part VI and VII will conclude with the proposed statute, using 
the rationales developed throughout this Comment.17 
II. TEXAS DESIGN-BUILD INDUSTRY AND LESSONS-LEARNED POLICIES 
In 2018, Texas contributed roughly $1.8 trillion to the total 
U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) of $20.6 trillion.18 Texas 
Design-Build projects contributed $94.2 billion (approximately 5.3% 
of Texas GDP).19 In 2019, the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex was the 
second-busiest building market in the country, totaling $22.5 billion.20 
Only New York City had more total construction.21 Astoundingly, this 
was the fourth year in a row north Texas construction broke $20 
billion, with nonresidential commercial projects rising 14% from 
2018.22 
As with most booming industries, the estimated cost of 
industry-related litigation is expected to rise.23 There are two main 
reasons why litigation expenses may rise in Texas. First, Texas has a 
horrid reputation for construction worker safety.24 The payout for 
these types of claims can rise to astronomical levels; for example, a 
 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. See infra Part VI–VII. 
 18. Ken Simonson, The Economic Impact of Construction in the United States 
and Texas, ASS’N GEN. CONTRACTORS AM. (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.agc.org/learn/construction-data/state-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/39GD-JP2N]. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Steve Brown, Dallas-Fort Worth’s Construction Boom Ranks Second 
Nationally in 2019, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:14 AM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/real-estate/2020/02/11/d-fw-was-a-top-us-
market-for-construction-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/HE2E-Q8XU]. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Jeffrey Kozek, Five Construction Litigation Trends for 2019, THE BUILDER 
ONLINE: BLOG (Jan. 3, 2019) https://www.builderonline.com/building/five-
construction-litigation-trends-for-2019 [https://perma.cc/5253-DCVR]. 
 24. See Gus Bova, Texas Workers Are Dying on the Job at Alarming Rates, TEX. 
OBSERVER (July 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/texas-
workers-are-dying-on-the-job-at-alarming-rates/ [https://perma.cc/TE2B-93LD]. 
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Texas jury awarded a construction worker $44 million in damages in 
connection with injuries that he sustained while working.25 Second, 
the overall number of construction defect cases has exploded for the 
past two decades and will no doubt cause many more claims in 
Texas.26 This will be especially true because many Design-Build 
contractors are hiring less experienced workers whose work often 
results in defect claims.27  
Adoption of lessons-learned policies could prevent the causes 
of increased litigation expenses.28 The idea of these policies is simple: 
Like individuals, business organizations cannot afford to keep making 
the same mistakes again and again.29 Businesses, however, cannot 
readily collect, analyze, store, disseminate, and reuse previously 
acquired knowledge from their memories as an individual can.30 This 
is because human memory reflects the individual’s natural ability to 
gain, store, and retrieve knowledge.31 Whereas, organizational 
memory refers to the collective ability to accumulate, store, and 
retrieve knowledge.32  
As such, organizational memory relies on employee 
experience and knowledge.33 Without a repository to store collective 
knowledge, the organizational memory may vanish through employee 
turnover.34 In an attempt to preserve and maintain organizational 
 
 25. John Chapman, Houston Construction Worker Awarded $44 Million Verdict 
for Leg Amputation Caused by Crane Accident, HEYGOOD, ORR, & PEARSON (May 
15, 2015), https://www.hop-law.com/houston-construction-worker-awarded-44-
million-verdict-leg-amputation-crane-accident/ [https://perma.cc/B7CU-G3ZH].  
 26. See generally Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Notice and Opportunity to Repair 
Construction Defects: An Imperfect Response to the Perfect Storm, 43 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 729 (2009). 
 27. Kozek, supra note 23. 
 28. See generally Ximena Ferrad et al., A Lessons-learned System for 
Construction Project Management: A Preliminary Application, 226 PROCEDIA - 
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 302, 303 (2016). 
 29. Stephanie A. Trevino & Vittal S. Anantatmula, Capitalizing from Past 
Projects: The Value of Lessons Learned, PROJECT MGMT. INST. (July 16, 2008), 
https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/business-benefits-value-lessons-learned-7116 
[https://perma.cc/X7H3-9H73]. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Organizational Memory – Definition and Meaning, MKTG. BUS. NEWS, 
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/organizational-memory-
definition-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/KWK4-WLEP] (last visited May 18, 2019). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Organizational Memory, BUS. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organizational-memory.html 
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memory and to prevent reinventing the wheel regarding projects with 
overlapping characteristics, businesses are implementing lessons-
learned policies.35 These policies allow the business to improve and 
reduce costs by learning from past projects and incorporating those 
lessons into new projects or policies.36 
The practice of capturing and archiving knowledge is not 
new.37 The concept of lessons-learned, however, has evolved into a 
formal and structured management practice.38 In general, the practice 
requires two essential activities: capturing important lessons from 
projects and making effective use of them.39 As such, lessons-learned 
policies often require businesses to document both the success and 
failures of a project.40  
The Design-Build sector is a prime field for the adoption of 
lessons-learned policies.41 Design-Build companies are project-based 
organizations, because much of their knowledge is generated on site 
from projects they carry out.42 Projects are an important source of 
expert know-how and organizational knowledge.43 As such, the 
Design-Build industry is actively attempting to incorporate lessons-
learned policies into the business model.44 
In essence, lessons-learned policies in the Design-Build 
industry are a way for companies to learn from their mistakes and take 
the steps necessary to prevent worker harm or construction defects. As 
these are the main reasons why costs of litigation will increase, the 
industry should feel free to implement lessons-learned policies 
without fear of their conclusions being discovered. As will be explored 
below, the primary rationale underlying the SCAP is to prevent the 
“chilling effect of disclosure.”45 Thus, the industry seems to be in the 
 
[https://perma.cc/7MV2-4FWR] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 35. Trevino & Anantatmula, supra note 29.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Ferrad et al., supra note 28, at 305. 
 42. Id. at 302.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 303.  
 45. Josh Jones, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-
Critical Analysis Privilege, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1638–39 (2003) (citing 
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 382 (N.D. Ga. 2001)). 
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best position to benefit from the SCAP as it is attempting to use self-
disclosure to improve services for others.  
III. THE LANDSCAPE OF PRIVILEGES 
Privileges “reflect societal choices that certain relationships or 
activities (such as seeking legal or medical advice) should be valued 
above others.”46 “[S]ociety needs privileges because in their absence, 
individuals will be discouraged from engaging in certain socially 
desirable behavior.”47 For example, the attorney-client privilege “is 
the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to 
the common law.”48 Its purpose is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients, thus promoting 
broader public interests in the observance of law and the 
administration of justice.49  
Yet, there are clear reasons against adopting privileges. As 
Justice Scalia noted, “justice . . . is severely harmed by contravention 
of ‘the fundamental principle that “the public has a right to every 
man’s evidence.’”50 As such, “[privileges] are not lightly created . . . 
for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”51 This conflict 
between the need for privileges and the need for compulsory 
disclosure demonstrates how arguments for new privileges, such as 
the SCAP, should be well-reasoned and account for the right to every 
man’s evidence as well as incentives to encourage socially desirable 
behavior.  
This Comment analyzes arguments for and against adopting 
the SCAP in Texas. First, this Comment discusses the federal rules 
covering privileges; this discussion highlights the benefits of a flexible 
common-law-based system of privileges. Second, this Comment 
reviews the legal landscape of privileges in Texas. In doing so, this 
 
 46. Pam Jenoff, The Case for Candor: Application of the Self-Critical Analysis 
Privilege to Corporate Diversity Initiatives, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 569, 576 (2011). 
 47. Id. at 577. 
 48. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed. 
1940)). 
 51. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
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Comment will explain how the SCAP can be adopted and why it 
should be adopted.  
A. Federal Rules on Privileges 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), 
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 
needs of the case.”52  Thus, the question becomes: Which matters are 
privileged, and which matters are nonprivileged? Federal Rule of 
Evidence (“FRE”) 501 answers: “The common law—as interpreted by 
United States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a 
claim of privilege.”53 The language of the rule shows that “Congress 
turned its back to the idea of codified privileges and decided that its 
evolution will be governed largely by federal common law.”54 
In addition to the rule’s plain language, the legislative history 
of FRE 501 shows the intent to support the development of common 
law privileges.55 To start, the original FRE Article V proposal to 
Congress contained thirteen rules.56 In its original form, Article V 
bound the courts to honor nine different non-constitutional 
privileges.57 These nine privileges protected government-required 
reports, lawyer-client conversations, psychotherapist-patient 
conversations, husband-wife conversations, communications to 
clergymen, political vote privacy, trade secrets, secrets of state and 
other official information, and the identity of informers.58 Further, in 
its original form, Article V bound the federal courts to only recognize 
the privileges laid out in Article V or specified by Congress.59  
Yet, the committee amended Article V to eliminate most of the 
specified privileges.60 Instead, the finalized Article V turned solely 
into FRE 501, leaving United States courts to develop the law of 
 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 54. PAVEL WONSOWICZ, EVIDENCE: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 494 
(Michael H. Schwartz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017). 
 55. Id.  
 56. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee notes to 1974 enactment. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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privileges.61 The advisory committee justified this position in response 
to psychiatric organizations arguing against the deletion of one of the 
nine aforementioned privileges—the privilege on psychotherapist-
patient relationships. Here, the advisory committee declared:  
 
[I]n approving [FRE 501], the action of Congress 
should not be understood as disapproving any 
recognition of . . . any other of the enumerated 
privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. 
Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting 
the view that the recognition of a privilege . . . should 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.62 
 
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court found FRE 501 did 
not freeze the law governing privileges of witnesses but instead 
directed federal courts to “continue the evolutionary development of 
testimonial privileges.”63 In Jaffee, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether a privilege protecting confidential communications between 
a psychotherapist and her patient “promotes sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”64 The Court 
applied “reason and experience” in accordance with FRE 501, finding 
the standard promoted the idea that “the common law is not immutable 
but flexible.”65 In doing so, the Court upheld the decision to protect 
the notes concerning a patient and her therapist, thus crafting a 
privilege within the federal common law.66  
Further, FRE 501 recognizes the need for individual states to 
develop their own rules on privileges. FRE 501 states, “in civil cases, 
state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which 
state law supplies the rule of decision.”67 The advisory committee 
notes the rationale of this provision is that “federal law should not 
 
 61. Id. (FRE 502 was later added in 2007 specifying the attorney-client and 
work-product privileges).  
 62. Id.  
 63. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). 
 64. Id. at 9–10. 
 65. Id. at 8. 
 66. Id. at 10.  
 67. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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supersede that of the states in substantive areas such as privilege.”68 
Further, there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure 
from state policy.69 
B. Texas Rules on Privileges 
Texas holds a stricter, less flexible approach than the federal 
framework, resembling the original FRE Article V proposal.70 Texas 
intermediary courts are prohibited from recognizing and creating 
common law privileges.71 In fact, Texas Rule of Evidence (“TRE”) 
501 explicitly states that no privilege shall be recognized unless it 
derives from “a Constitution, a statute, . . . or other rule[] prescribed 
under statutory authority.”72 Texas seems to have adopted this strict 
approach with the recognition that “privileges expressly subordinate 
[the] goal of truth-seeking to other societal interests.”73 
Some Texas lawyers argue the state should adopt the federal 
approach or, at the least, recognize privileges already established 
under the federal common law. For example, In re Andrew Silver 
involved a contract dispute relating to the “Ziosk.”74 This device 
allowed restaurant patrons to order meals, play games, and pay checks 
at a dining table.75 The court inquired into whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to adopt the patent-agent privilege.76 
At the time, the patent-agent privilege was recently recognized by the 
federal courts.77 The court noted federal courts hold the ability to 
expand and create privileges under FRE 501, however, no court in 
Texas holds such ability.78 Citing additional rationale against 
privileges, the court refused the patent-agent privilege.79 
 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment. 
 69. Id.  
 70. TEX. R. EVID. 501 et seq. 
 71. TEX. R. EVID. 501; In re Silver, 500 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2016, no pet.). 
 72. TEX. R. EVID. 501. 
 73. Ludwig v. State, 931 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
 74. Silver, 500 S.W.2d at 642. 
 75. Id. at 645.  
 76. Id. at 646. 
 77. Id. at 645–46; In re Queen’s Univ., 820 F.3d 1287, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 78. Silver, 500 S.W.2d at 646. 
 79. Id. at 647.   
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Although there is a ban against judge-made privileges, Texas 
has still managed to create numerous privileges through the legislature 
alone. Some people have even commented the Texas Legislature 
“seems perpetually bent on creating more statutory privileges.”80 Yet, 
because of Texas’s recodification process, these privileges are 
incredibly difficult to piece together without the proper sources 
because they are scattered about varying subject-matter codes, causing 
many litigants to default to only those privileges found in the TRE.81  
For example, many researchers will look to the Health and 
Safety Code to find the “medical committee” and “peer-review” 
privileges.82 In that code, the researcher will find the section stating 
medical committees’ records and proceedings are confidential and not 
subject to a court subpoena.83 Without the proper research or practice 
guide, the researcher will likely miss the applicable exception to the 
privilege found in the Occupation Code, stating the privilege will not 
apply to civil rights or anticompetitive actions.84 This dilemma has 
caused some to say, “finding any sort of privilege within 
the codes is as easy as finding a needle in a haystack.”85 This 
complicated privilege scheme, in turn, causes some of these privileges 
to generate a fair amount of litigation,86 while others are lost in the 
statutory thicket.87 
Further, Texas limits the use of privileges by incorporating the 
offensive use doctrine into its law.88 The concept of the doctrine is that 
evidentiary privileges are meant to be used as shields, not swords.89 
Under the offensive use doctrine, a party seeking affirmative relief 
may not use a privilege to prevent an opposing party from discovering 
 
 80. STEVEN GOODE & OLIN G. WELLBORN III, GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF 
EVIDENCE—TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES § 501.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated 
May 2019). 
 81. Ellen Desrochers, That’s Privileged! Or Is It?: Uncovering Lost Privileges 
and Exceptions in Texas Codes, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 2 (2014). 
 82. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.031–.033. 
 83. § 161.032. 
 84. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007. 
 85. Desrochers, supra note 81 at 21. 
 86. GOODE & WELLBORN, supra note 80. 
 87. Desrochers, supra note 81 at 5.  
 88. William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide § 90.06, LEXIS (database 
updated March 2020). 
 89. Id.  
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outcome-determinative information regarding the nature of the 
claim.90 
Thus, it appears Texas has imposed its own measures to limit 
the use of privileges. By refusing the federal approach and vesting the 
power to create privileges largely with the legislature, privileges are 
not allowed to freely and flexibly develop under Texas common law 
principles. And although the legislature has created numerous 
privileges, it has scattered them throughout a complex system of 
subject-matter codes rendering it increasingly difficult for litigants to 
use them.  
C. Fitting into the Texas Framework 
As discussed above, the Texas and federal landscapes differ as 
to the development of new privileges.91 The federal system allows the 
development of privileges through the courts in light of reason and 
experience.92  Whereas, Texas prohibits the creation of court-crafted 
privileges, vesting the power to create and recognize privileges largely 
with the legislature.93 The SCAP developed under the federal 
system.94 Thus, the rationales supporting the SCAP found in the 
federal court system will not be enough to support its creation in the 
Texas system because they were expounded under a framework 
supporting flexibility.   
So, what Texas-specific policy considerations can be added to 
the rationales originally supporting the SCAP? Recall the dilemma 
explored above concerning the numerous statutory privileges found in 
Texas.95 The sheer number of privileges in Texas does not necessarily 
mean the state legislature acts in similar accordance to the courts in 
the federal system. But consider the following: Texas recognizes a 
chiropractor-patient privilege, a podiatrist-patient privilege, and a 
veterinarian-patient privilege.96 These privileges evidence the 
legislature’s willingness to adopt many privileges so long as they are 
 
 90. Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Tex. 1985). 
 91. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 92. FED. R. EVID. 501.  
 93. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 94. See infra Part IV. 
 95. See supra Part III.B. 
 96. GOODE & WELLBORN, supra note 80, at § 501.1. 
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narrow in application. For this reason, a proposed codification of the 
SCAP will work if it is confined to the Design-Build industry.  
Further, recall the issue discussed above concerning the 
medical peer-review privilege.97 There, a privilege exception was 
found within the Texas Occupation Code, despite the fact that the 
privilege was placed in the otherwise appropriate Health and Safety 
Code.98 The exception to the peer-review privilege disallowed the 
privilege in civil rights or anticompetitive actions.99 From this 
example, one can see an additional policy consideration that will 
support the adoption of the SCAP. The SCAP should be flexible and 
incorporate, or be designed to incorporate, exceptions found in 
different subject-matter codes.  
This seems fitting for a privilege designed solely for the 
Design-Build industry because many of Texas’s construction and 
architecture statutes are already scattered about different subject-
matter codes.100 Many of these laws reflect specific requirements for 
certain types of Design-Build projects one can undertake.101 With 
construction and architecture statutes being strewn about the varying 
subject-matter codes, the SCAP would be readily capable of working 
with and across different codes.  
Finally, additional policy support comes from those Texas 
privileges already in place. The state legislature recognizes the need 
for doctors to be evaluated without fear such evaluations will lead to 
litigious recourse. This is recognized through the medical peer-review 
privilege, as referenced above. The medical peer-review privilege 
“extends to the committee’s initial and subsequent credentialing 
decisions, as well as documents ‘generated’ by a committee or 
‘prepared by or at the direction of the committee for committee 
 
 97. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. For construction see TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 53.202 & 53.284; TEX. INS. CODE 
§ 151.102–.104; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 272.001. For architecture see TEX. OCC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 1051.001–.801 (Architecture Practice Act); TEX. PROP. CODE § 
201.011; TEX. GOV. CODE § 2166.408.  
 101. See TEX. GOV. CODE § 311.023; TEX. EDUC. CODE § 44.038; TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE § 17.44 et seq. (Texas Residential Construction Liability Act). 
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purposes.’”102 The underlying rationales of the medical peer-review 
privilege are practically the same as the SCAP.103 
Similarly, Texas recognizes another statutory privilege to 
shield the collection, compilation, and analysis of nursing home 
care.104 This “nursing home” privilege also incorporates a peer-review 
mechanism.105 In fact, this peer-review requirement led to the court’s 
decision in Capital Senior Mgmt. 1, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. 
Servs.106 There, the operator of a nursing home sued Human Services 
to prevent disclosure of information regarding the nursing home.107 
The documents included investigations regarding complaints of abuse 
and neglect.108 The court held the operator did not engage a deliberate 
peer-review and simply gave the documents to Human Services as 
required.109 Because of the lack of deliberate peer-review, the court 
allowed Human Services to disclose the information.110 
With Texas’s peer-review privileges in mind, a statute for the 
SCAP should specify that deliberate communications are protected. 
Like the peer-review privileges mentioned above, the deliberateness 
of the communication ultimately dictates whether the SCAP will 
attach or not. The state legislature can readily include this requirement 
in a proposed statute. As discussed below, this requirement would also 
square nicely with previous decisions interpreting the SCAP’s 
applicability in certain situations.  
 
 102. Zenith Ins. v. Texas Inst. for Surgery, 328 F.R.D. 153, 163 (N.D. Tex. 
2018) (citing In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 698–700 (Tex. 
2015)). 
 103. Richard L. Kaiser, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege for Products 
Liability: What Is It, And How Can It Be Achieved in Wisconsin?, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
119, 120 (1999). 
 104. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.049(d)–(e). 
 105. Capital Senior Mgmt. 1, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 132 S.W.3d 71, 
79 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 73. 
 108. Id. at 75. 
 109. Id. at 79. 
 110. Id.   
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IV. THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
A. Development 
As stated above, Congress did not intend to “freeze the law of 
privilege.”111 Instead, FRE 501 provided the courts with “the 
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,” and 
“leave the door open for change.”112 This flexibility allowed the 
federal system to recognize the SCAP.113  
The SCAP “is designed to protect the opinions and 
recommendations of corporate employees engaged in the process of 
critical self-evaluation of the company’s policies for the purpose of 
improving health and safety.”114 In essence, the SCAP “seeks to 
encourage candid self-criticism,” and “prevent[s] a ‘chilling’ effect on 
self-analysis and self-evaluation prepared for the purpose of protecting 
the public by instituting practices assuring safer operations.”115 Thus, 
the SCAP is based on the rationale that society benefits when a party’s 
employees engage in critical evaluations of the party’s conduct, 
unfettered by the fear that such comments may be discoverable and 
used adversely.116 
The SCAP was first recognized in Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. 
during a  medical malpractice suit.117 The court in Bredice denied 
access to the minutes and reports of a hospital staff meeting, stating 
that “[t]here is an overwhelming public interest in having those staff 
meetings held on a confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and 
advice can continue unimpeded.”118 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed 
the Bredice decision without opinion.119 Thus, the SCAP generally 
 
 111. Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). 
 112. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974)). 
 113. MaryAnn Joerres, Privileges and the Oil Patch, 18TH ANNUAL ADVANCED 
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW COURSE, CH. 6, 14 (2000), 
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/2137/47843_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7DF-HBSL].   
 114. Felder v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 153 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224–25 
(D.D.C. 2015) (citing Granger v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 116 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D. 
Pa. 1987)). 
 115. Id. at 225 (citing FTC v. T.R.W., Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).  
 116. Id. (citing Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992)). 
 117. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970). 
 118. Id. at 251. 
 119. Joerres, supra note 113, at 14. 
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applied to records containing internal evaluations that, if produced, 
would impede the candid discussion of ideas.120 
The extension of the SCAP beyond the medical malpractice 
area is slow and often narrowly drawn.121 Some federal courts adopt 
the SCAP in a limited capacity while others have never even heard a 
case concerning its application.122 Generally, it appears courts are 
increasingly unreceptive to the SCAP.123 Some courts have even held, 
“it is unclear whether a federal self-critical analysis privilege exists” 
because of its inconsistent success rate among the various circuit 
courts.124 
Indeed, the Northern District of Texas merely referenced the 
SCAP when attempting to balance the value of making documents and 
communications discoverable with the corporation’s interest in self-
investigation and preparation for litigation.125 The Fifth Circuit also 
refused to recognize the SCAP when a government agency sought 
certain documents.126 However, in that case, the Fifth Circuit declined 
to rule whether the SCAP may be recognized under different 
circumstances.127 
Despite the utter lack of enthusiasm, jurisdictions have 
successfully applied the SCAP in a variety of contexts: such as 
workplace safety, products liability, legal compliance for 
pharmaceutical companies, police department safety reviews, 
securities litigation, and libel.128 Additionally, many states have 
adopted statutes in some form of the SCAP in a narrowed and 
particular capacity.129 For example, most states utilize a peer-review 
system for hospital incident reports.130 One thing is certain, however, 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 14. 
 122. Id.  
 123. CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION §§ 6.01 FN 1, 
6.03 LexisNexis (database updated May 2019) (The SCAP is also known as self-
evaluation privilege, self-evaluative privilege, or the privilege of self-critical 
evaluation). 
 124. Id. 
 125. In re LTV Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 621 n.22 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 126. In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 127. Id. 
 128. CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, supra note 123, 
at § 6.01. 
 129. Kaiser, supra note 103, at 120. 
 130. Id.  
  
246 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
the SCAP is limited to evaluations and does not protect the underlying 
facts.131  
B. Specific Circumstances and Uses 
Case law can be a valuable tool to understanding potential 
paths a proposed statute could take. Fortunately, the SCAP has been 
found to apply in multiple industries—despite the small rate of use. 
Using these cases, this Comment hopes to find key language and 
approaches that a proposed statute could utilize.  
1. Government Reports 
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts addressed the applicability of the SCAP in the context 
of government-mandated reports.132 In Block Island Fishing, Inc., a 
lobster fishing boat crashed into a tanker.133 The owner of the fishing 
boat filed suit, seeking a determination limiting his liability.134 More 
importantly, however, the owner of the tanker asserted the SCAP to 
exclude deposition testimony evidencing the conclusions of a post-
accident investigation report.135 This report was mandated as part of 
an international treaty.136  
Adopting the four-part test outlined in O’Connor v. Chrysler 
Corp., the court found the  SCAP applied.137 Under the O’Connor 
four-part test, or “potential guidepost” for application, the SCAP 
applies when: (1) the materials are made pursuant to a mandatory 
government report; (2) its application is limited to only subjective, 
evaluative materials; (3) its application does not protect objective data 
in those same reports; and (4) the requesting party’s need for such 
materials does not outweigh the need for protection.138 The court 
 
 131. Id. at 125. 
 132. Kelly J. Bundy, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege: Under Construction or 




 133. 323 F. Supp. 3d 158, 160 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 162. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 161 (citing O’Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 
1980)). 
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allowed the privilege to stand, finding the post-accident report 
satisfied the four-part test.139 That the report was part of a mandated 
international treaty, thus satisfying the first prong, was likely 
dispositive to the SCAP’s applicability.140 
The case is useful for discovering a potential, albeit very 
limited, pathway the proposed statute could take. The statute could be 
written to conform with the four-part test outlined in O’Connor, 
protecting only internal investigations compelled by the government. 
This path could limit the potential cost of litigation in workplace or 
accident lawsuits, but the goal of the SCAP is to allow for internal 
assessment for the sake of self-improvement. A statute protecting only 
mandated investigations and reports would not protect ordinary cost-
saving measures such as lessons-learned reports and would require the 
government to determine what is worth improving—not the Design-
Build company.   
2. Environmental Compliance 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida addressed the applicability of the SCAP in the context of a 
chemical company’s environmental compliance reports.141 In 
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., the court extended the 
privilege to retrospective environmental reports.142 The reports 
analyzed past conduct, practices, and occurrences relating to past 
pollution.143 The court noted a strong public interest in promoting the 
voluntary identification and remediation of industrial pollution 
because pollution poses a serious public health risk.144  
Fortunately, the Texas Environmental Health and Safety Audit 
Privilege Act provides an environmental “audit report” is 
privileged.145 This “audit report” essentially would allow a business to 
protect the same type of report protected in Reichhold Chems. without 
the need for an additional SCAP statute.146 As such, Texas has 
welcomed the court’s conclusion that environmental compliance can 
 
 139. Id. at 162–63. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Reichhold Chems. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 527. 
 144. Id. at 526. 
 145. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 1101.001, .101 (2019). 
 146. Id.  
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be readily incentivized by the SCAP. As such, this Comment posits 
Reichhold Chems. stands for the general proposition that a business 
should be allowed to evaluate compliance with the law on the whole, 
rather than simply allowing businesses to assess compliance with 
environmental regulations.147   
In the Design-Build context, compliance with other laws could 
save an enormous amount of resources because the industry is subject 
to a plethora of safety regulations.148 For example, construction 
workers must adhere to strict safety-harness regulations.149 Absent an 
accident, it would still be in the best interest of a company to internally 
investigate safety-harness use to ensure everyone utilized the correct 
rope length, buckles, or weight class. If, by a miracle, no accident 
occurred but the company found many workers violated the 
regulations, the company would be allowed to take the steps necessary 
to be legally compliant and ensure safety for their workers.   
3. Product Liability 
The D.C. District Court applied the SCAP in the context of a 
product liability suit.150 In Bradley v. Melroe Co., the plaintiff sought 
to compel reports resulting from the product makers internal 
investigations.151 The reports concerned seven different accidents 
involving the same product, which allegedly harmed the plaintiff.152 
When analyzing the applicability of the SCAP, the court took special 
care to frame the important steps the company took to investigate the 
accidents.153 
First, the court found the company routinely and deliberately 
investigated the accidents for the purposes of ascertaining whether 
preventative measures could be taken.154 Second, the court succinctly 
explained the type of information that could be protected under the 
 
 147. Reichhold Chems. Inc., 157 F.R.D. at 524. 
 148. OSHA – Workplace Safety and Health Requirements, TEX. WORKFORCE 
COMM’N, https://www.twc.texas.gov/news/efte/osha.html [https://perma.cc/WP5D-
PYP6] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 149. Eric Duncan, OSHA Safety Harness Requirement, LEGAL BEAGLE (Oct. 25, 
2017), https://legalbeagle.com/13635666-osha-safety-harness-requirement.html 
[https://perma.cc/92PZ-TC2X]. 
 150. Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 151. Id. at 1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 2. 
 154. Id.  
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SCAP as mental impressions, opinions, theories, recommendations, 
and evaluations.155 Finding the reports were of this same nature, the 
court concluded the SCAP was applicable, resting its conclusions on 
the motivating public policy rationales previously mentioned.156 
Additionally, the court took special care to define the nature of 
the SCAP.157 By comparing the SCAP to the work product doctrine, 
the court held it was a qualified privilege.158 Thus, the SCAP applied 
subject to the traditional test for qualified privileges at the federal level 
wherein the requesting party must show substantial need.159 
Ultimately, there was not a showing of substantial need in this case.160 
However, the court concluded the underlying facts present in the 
reports warranted partial disclosure.161 Even still, the court ordered all 
mental impressions, opinions, theories, recommendations, and 
evaluations redacted.162 
The specific lessons to be drawn from this case reinforce what 
the actual protections should be: mental impressions, opinions, 
theories, recommendations, and evaluations. A statute should use this 
language directly when determining the SCAP’s scope. The Bredice 
court and the O’Connor court essentially upheld the SCAP as a 
qualified privilege as well. In Bredice, the court stated that an injured 
party could show “extraordinary circumstances” amounting to good 
cause to permit disclosure.163 As such, regardless of the approach the 
statute should take, the SCAP for Design-Build companies should also 
be qualified.  
C. The Dowling Elements 
When constructing a proposed statute for the SCAP, the 
different approaches to construction are apparent after analyzing case 
law and the different contexts in which it applies. Some courts take 
full stock in the type of report and whether the investigation is 
mandated or not, as seen in the Block Island Fishing, Inc. court’s 
 
 155. Id. at 3.  
 156. Id. at 2–3. 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. Id. at 2–3. 
 159. Id. at 3.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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application of the O’Connor four-part test.164 Other courts measure the 
deliberateness of the self-evaluations before applying the SCAP.165 
Another approach to applying the SCAP was set forth in Dowling v. 
Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc. This Comment posits the proposed model 
SCAP statute should replicate the framework outlined in Dowling.  
In Dowling, a seaman sued his employer for negligent 
attendance.166 The seaman fell while aboard the ship, severely injuring 
his back.167 In discovery, the seaman attempted to compel minutes 
from the vessel’s safety committee meetings for a period of two years 
prior to accident.168 The trial court denied the motion to compel 
because the seaman was not entitled to “delve into the minds of the 
committee members.”169 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the decision because the trial court had concluded that the “essential 
test” of whether the privilege applies “involves balancing the public 
interest protected by the privilege against the plaintiff’s need for the 
material to make his case.”170  
The Ninth Circuit Court refused to apply the same test used in 
the lower court and instead applied a three-factor test often used in 
other jurisdictions to determine the SCAP’s applicability.171 Under 
this three-factor test, a party asserting the SCAP must demonstrate the 
material satisfies the following criteria: (1) it results from a critical 
self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2)  the 
public must have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the 
type of information sought; and (3) the information must be of the type 
in which allowing discovery would curtail free flow of information.172 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court added the general requirement 
that the materials be prepared with the expectation of confidentiality 
and that the materials have in fact been kept confidential.173 Case law 
 
 164. See Block Island Fishing, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161–65 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 165. Bradley, 141 F.R.D. at 3 (quoting Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 
F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982)). 
 166. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 424 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 425.  
 170. Id. at 426. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 425–26. 
 173. Id. at 426 (citing James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-
Critical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 574–76 (1983)). 
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interpreting these factors will be helpful to determine a proper course 
the statute should take.  
First, the protected information must have resulted from a 
critical self-analysis.174 Courts utilizing the Dowling elements have 
included accident reports, internal reviews, and committee reports as 
information resulting from a critical self-analysis.175 For example, in 
Gillman v. United States, the court permitted a mental hospital to 
withhold information gained through critical self-analysis processes 
following the suicide of one of its patients.176 These processes 
included broad inquiries conducted by the hospital to determine 
whether disciplinary or hospital procedures should be changed.177 
Citing the Bredice decision, and essentially following the first criteria 
set forth in Dowling, the court ultimately applied the SCAP to the 
conclusions drawn from the broad inquiries.178 
The first criterion of the Dowling test is essential to the SCAP 
framework. As previously mentioned, it is the critical self-evaluation 
that gives rise to improvements in the long term. As such, a proposed 
SCAP statute should also require the materials be prepared through 
self-critical evaluation processes. Thus, this first criterion sets forth 
the SCAP’s rule of attachment to protected materials. In the Design-
Build context, this rule of attachment would ultimately protect 
accident reports, investigatory reports, and other lessons-learned 
reports that could encourage the improvement of safety and quality 
practices.  
Collectively, the second and third criteria of Dowling state that 
the information must be of the type that allowing discovery of would 
curtail the flow of information, indicating a strong public interest for 
protection.179 Although not citing directly to Dowling, the court in 
Granger v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, dissected this criteria in detail by 
exploring the general policy underpinnings of the SCAP.180 In 
Granger, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel in certain 
respects.181 The motion requested compulsion of a committee report 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Joerres, supra note 113, at 16. 
 176. 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 177. Id. at 319. 
 178. Id. at 318–19. 
 179. Dowling, 971 F.2d at 423. 
 180. 116 F.R.D. 507, 508–09 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 181. See id. at 510–11. 
  
252 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
with the following sections: (1) Accident Analysis; (2) Cause; (3) 
Contributing Factors; and (4) Committee Recommendations.182 The 
court compelled as to sections 2 and 3 but denied compulsion as to 
sections 1 and 4.183 The court granted the motion as to sections 2 and 
3 because they clearly encompassed opinions and recommendations 
that come within the ambit of the SCAP.184 In other words, the court 
protected these sections because they were prepared for the purpose of 
protecting the public by instituting practices assuring safer 
operations.185 The court denied the motion as to sections 1 and 4 
because “[t]he cause of an accident and factors contributing to an 
accident are at the heart of [the] action.”186  
And finally, the Dowling court adopted the requirement that 
the materials must be prepared with the expectation of confidentiality 
and have in fact been kept confidential.187 As with many privileges, 
this general provision is based upon the rationale that “without 
confidentiality, there will be a loss of candor.”188 The court in Peterson 
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., reiterated this point by stating, “it 
would make little sense to allow material to be protected from 
discovery that was not intended to be protected by those originating 
it.”189 
As stated above, the proposed model statute should incorporate 
the criteria set forth in Dowling. Specifically, a general definition 
section should set forth the criteria that allow the SCAP to attach. For 
example, under the first criterion, the protected information should 
result from an analysis of facts pertaining to a specific event or project. 
As seen in Gillman, these would include reports relating to specific 
accidents or procedures. The proposed SCAP statute should include 
the second and third criteria by including a purpose provision 
specifying that the purpose of SCAP is to facilitate the free flow of 
information to ensure safety and quality improvements in the Design-
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 183. Id. at 511. 
 184. Id. at 510. 
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 187. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Build industry. The statute must also include a waiver provision 
spelling out the conditions where the privilege is inapplicable, such as 
when confidentiality is compromised.  
V. THE FAILURE OF ALTERNATIVE PROTECTIONS 
Other scholars have noted that businesses may be able to shield 
self-critical documents through other and more widely recognized 
privileges.190 However, this Comment posits other privileges neither 
offer sufficient protections for self-evaluation reports conducted in the 
Design-Build space,191 nor are these privileges appropriate for use in 
the Design-Build space given their policy underpinnings.192  
A. Subsequent Remedial Measures Doctrine 
It is not uncommon for scholars to compare the SCAP to the 
subsequent remedial measures doctrine.193 The doctrine is codified in 
the FRE and bars evidence of subsequent measures that could have 
made a harm less likely to occur to prove negligence and culpable 
conduct.194 The TRE also contains the same doctrine.195 One can see 
the clear parallels between the doctrine of subsequent remedial 
measures and the SCAP.   
Both doctrines exclude relevant evidence to allow individuals 
to prevent future problems by utilizing self-help.196 Similarly, each 
method recognizes the basic unfairness in requiring parties to produce 
for subsequent lawsuits a “smoking gun” that they created in an 
attempt to correct perceived shortcomings internally.197 However, 
there are several distinctions between the two doctrines.  
First, the subsequent remedial measures doctrine relates only 
to admissibility of evidence at trial and not to discoverability, which 
is what the self-critical analysis privilege aims to protect.198 The 
present, chilling effects of discovery would therefore persist 
 
 190. Bundy, supra note 132. 
 191. See infra Part V. 
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 194. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
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unabated.199 Further, the rule only protects studies or measures that are 
taken subsequent to an injury or claim.200 In the case of most lessons-
learned reports in the construction industry the investigation often 
takes place prior to the incident.201 
Second, the purpose of the subsequent remedial measures 
doctrine is to encourage individuals to remedy defects that could cause 
injury.202 This is a far too narrow policy consideration considering the 
SCAP, which is purposed on the idea of preventing injury to others 
and encouraging innovations.203 Thus, under the subsequent remedial 
measures doctrine, lessons-learned policies would not be well 
protected.  
B. Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege 
Most often, the strongest grounds for protecting internal 
information are the attorney-client and the attorney work product 
privileges.204 Based on a foundation similar to the SCAP, the attorney-
client privilege protects confidential communications based upon 
public policy concerns regarding the chilling effect of disclosure.205 
Thus, the attorney-client privilege recognizes that fostering open 
dialogue between parties often requires that the communications not 
be used as weapons against those involved.206  
Empirical evidence shows the attorney-client privilege does 
enhance transparency among parties.207 Courts often import this 
reasoning into an analysis of the SCAP’s applicability in certain 
situations.208 Additionally, the attorney-client privilege protects only 
the communications, and not the underlying facts, the same way that 
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the SCAP does.209 However, this privilege falls far short of protecting 
lessons-learned reports in the design-build industry.   
The attorney-client privilege only applies where a client is 
seeking legal advice from counsel, but lessons-learned reports are 
often made by corporate employees to better some aspect of project 
management.210 Moreover, lessons-learned reports do not solely, or 
even primarily, consist of the kind of legal advice that would be 
protected by attorney-client privilege.211 Instead, the reports cover a 
wide range of topics, such as allocation of hours, deadlines on project 
milestones, or delivery procedures.212 
Additionally, with respect to the attorney-client privilege in the 
corporate context, there is “a question of who the client is”.213 
Generally, the protection of the privilege only extends to corporate 
officers and supervisory personnel.214 Thus, communications by many 
of the participants in lessons-learned reports, including the rank and 
file employees, would not be protected.215  
For similar reasons, the attorney work product doctrine, which 
protects documents containing the attorney’s opinions, mental 
processes, and opinions of counsel, would not suffice to protect the 
reports.216 In addition to sharing the problem with attorney-client 
privilege, the attorney work product doctrine only protects documents 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.217 Lessons-learned reports are 
undertaken proactively rather than in anticipation of litigation and 
therefore would fall outside the privilege.218 
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Thus, the limitations of the attorney-client or work product 
privileges highlight an additional benefit of the SCAP. Mainly, the 
SCAP saves time and money because corporate employees may freely 
discuss ideas to improve the business without the need for attorneys. 
In the Design-Build industry, this is incredibly special because it 
would allow multiple architects and construction project managers to 
work together without having the expensive and otherwise useless 
lawyer present. The SCAP would essentially avoid the “who is 
privileged” question and the requirement to seek legal advice.  
C. Trade Secret Privilege 
Under the TRE, individuals have a privilege to refuse to 
disclose or prevent others from disclosing a trade secret.219 A trade 
secret is often defined as a formula, pattern, device, or compilation of 
information that provides one with the opportunity to gain an 
advantage over competitors that do not know the information.220 The 
person who owns the trade secret, or the person’s agent or employee, 
may claim this privilege.221  
The trade secret must be confidential, and the information must 
not be publicly available or readily ascertainable by independent 
investigation.222 In other words, there must be “a substantial element 
of secrecy” for the information to constitute a trade secret.223 The 
owner is required to take efforts to maintain and protect the secrecy of 
the information.224 If a court orders a person to disclose a trade secret, 
it must take any protective measure required by the interests of the 
privilege holder and the parties and to further justice.225 
The trade secret privilege would likely exclude the lessons-
learned reports because often times, an outside investigation could 
lead to the facts creating the final opinion. Further, trade secrets are 
 
 219. TEX. R. EVID. 507. 
 220. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996). 
 221. TEX. R. EVID. 507. 
 222. Richardson & Assocs. v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583, 
586 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1966, no writ). 
 223. Rimes v. Club Corp. of Am., 542 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 
1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Furr’s, Inc. v. United Specialty Advert. Co., 338 S.W.2d 762, 
765 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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factual in nature, often resembling formula or schematics. The final 
conclusion or opinion drawn from a lessons-learned investigation 
would likely not be covered.  
VI. THE PROPOSED STATUTE AND COMMENTARY 
DESIGN-BUILD PRIVILEGE OF SELF-CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS 
Section (a). (Purpose.) The Legislature finds a 
strong and compelling rationale for the adoption of 
a limited and qualified form of the Self-Critical 
Analysis Privilege. This statute enables and 
facilitates candid discussion and innovation in the 
Design-Build industry.  
 
The Title and Section (a) get to the point right away. Others 
have constructed a SCAP statute that would span across multiple 
industries and fields.226 But as discussed in Parts II and III, a proposed 
model statute in Texas must be narrowly defined.227 Recall further, 
that the primary purpose for this statute is to protect lessons-learned 
reports.228 In turn, this will enable Design-Build companies to prevent 
risks associated with design-defect and employee injury claims.229   
 
Section (b). (Definitions.) As used in this Statute: 
1. “Design-Build Business” includes those 
companies, businesses, partnerships engaged in the 
act of designing or providing construction services 
to the general public, as defined by Tex. Civ. Prac. 
& Rem. §§ 16.009 and 150.001.  
2. “Self-Critical Analysis” are those deliberate 
internal reviews, communications, or investigations 
into major policy or procedures, conducted by or on 
behalf of a Design-Build Business’s management, 
which contain or result in subjective mental 
impressions, opinions, theories, and 
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 229. Id. 
  
258 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
recommendations concerning the policy, 
procedure, or otherwise compliance with applicable 
law, that has been kept confidential among the 
Design-Build Business’s management. 
3. “Holder of the Privilege” is the Design-Build 
Business who engaged in Self-Critical Analysis 
prior to the time disclosure is sought. 
 
Section (b)(1) defines the Design-Build actors who may 
invoke the SCAP. As discussed in Part III, many of the Design-Build 
claims arise under the Texas Civil Practice Code.230 
Section (b)(2) incorporates several elements discussed in Parts 
III and IV and essentially sets forth the rules of attachment.231 The act 
triggering attachment must be deliberate.232 As seen by Texas’s peer-
review privileges, there is more weight and acceptance of a privilege 
that requires deliberate action.233 In this provision, there is also the 
recognition that a business should utilize the SCAP to assess legal 
compliance.234 Further, the objects being protected are only subjective 
conclusions, allowing for discovery of the underlying facts while 
shielding the resulting reports.235  
Section (b)(3) includes only those Design-Build actors who 
had the ability to and did pursue a self-critical analysis. This limitation 
ensures actors will not be compelled to use the SCAP as the work-
product doctrine. 
 
Section (c). (General Rule.) If discovery of a Self-
Critical Analysis is sought by an adverse party, the 
Holder of the Privilege may refuse to disclose, and 
prevent another from disclosing, the Self-Critical 
Analysis. 
Section (d). (Waiver.) The Privilege is waived to the 
extent that the Holder of the Privilege voluntarily 
discloses a significant part of the self-critical 
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analysis or consents to such disclosure by anyone, 
except as necessary to further the goals of the 
investigation. Consent to disclosure shall be found 
if the Holder of the Privilege acts in a manner 
inconsistent with an intention to maintain the 
Privilege.  
 
Sections (c) and (d) are at the core of the statute. Here, the 
confidentiality requirement discussed in Dowling is present.236 The 
idea of waiver is that the management structure is in the best position 
to effect change to policy or procedure.237  
 
Section (e). (Exception.)  
1. Where an adverse party shows the court 
Substantial Need or Extraordinary Circumstances, 
this Privilege yields to the extent necessary and 
compulsion or disclosure may occur. 
2. Exceptions to this statute may be created or 
modified by a reinterpretation of proceeding 
statutes by the highest court of this state or by 
subsequent legislation.  
 
Section (e)(1) defines the SCAP as a qualified privilege. 
Recall, that many courts applying the SCAP do so as a qualified 
privilege.238 Section (e)(2) allows the SCAP to be flexible and 
incorporate or be designed to incorporate exceptions found in different 
subject-matter codes.239 Recall that as a general observation, this 
flexibility of added exceptions was a predominant feature among the 
Texas’s privileges.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Texas’s Design-Build sector is growing fast. With this trend, 
Texas can expect an increase in construct-defect, design-defect, and 
construction injury lawsuits. Rather than create economic waste by 
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encouraging litigious recourse, Texas should adopt a very narrow, 
codified form of the SCAP. Doing so will allow Design-Build 
businesses to take the steps necessary to prevent defects and injury to 
others without fear their internal evaluations will be used against them 
at trial. 
This Comment proposed a model statute for the Texas 
Legislature to adopt. This statute is written in a manner to comport 
with traditional notions of fairness, as its application is limited and 
qualified. For example, the scope of the SCAP is limited solely to 
those subjective evaluations resulting from internal investigations or 
the increasingly popular lessons-learned policies. Although the statute 
drafted above is limited to the construction industry, it forms the basis 
for further extensions into other industries. Specifically, this statute 
could easily be modified to other property-related industries such as 
product design, manufacturing, or oil and gas production. Texas needs 
to encourage others to prevent harm, waste, or loss when possible. It 
is time Texas implements a privilege to further this aim.   
 
